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lecture notes from my classe phl210 (c) copyleft alex.privalov aka tom.sawyer.. p.s. if you have any corrections feel free to leave a comment at the end of each post, it'd be greatly appreciated

Friday, November 11, 2005

 

Phl210. Lec9. Leibniz. Nov 8 '05

Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716)

Rationals – search for foundation of science. L is lawyer, math hobby, invention of calculus, dispute with Newton. Now we use Leibniz notation. Criticized Cartesians laws of motion.

569 . L writes headings first.

On the divine perfection and that God does everything in most desirable way

God is absolutely perfect being. Consequences of it? Several entirely diff perfections in nature and they all belong to him in highest degree. What is perfection? Forms and natures that are not capable of highest (maximum) degree are not perfection such as greatest number involves a contradiction [ there is no max number ] (ex. Power's max degree is that covers all possibilities). Max degree of power/knowledge involves no contradiction!

Spinoza had sharp distinction b/w looking at world anthropomorphically (how we desire) and how it is really is, L disagrees with this distinction. L said, that 'the more enlightenment we are about god's works the more we'll find them in conformity with our desire'. God’s creation is such that perfectly wise man will find it perfect in every way. The more we understand creation the wiser we are the more our desire is precisely what we find in creation, creation becomes everything we can possibly want.

Against Those Who Claim There is no Goodness in God's Work or that the Rules of Goodness are Arbitrary.

1st one is Spinoza as his target. Works of God are good for the sole reason that God has made them. External denomination – [chair] label I put on things b/c I relate to them in a certain way, it does not identify anything in the thing itself. L says, some people say this: ”what makes world good is that God considers it good”, so goodness is external denomination, nothing in thing itself that makes it good. L denies this position, on the contrary, he says, things are good in themselves. Without seeing goodness in creations we have no way to conclude that god is good. By considering his works we discover their creator, works must carry his mark in themselves. If we recognize something good in creation itself and so deduce that their creator is also good. Otherwise we cannot conclude that god is good. Spinoza's develops idea that goodness is only extrinsic denomination. What makes a pie good is that god has decided, labeled pie as a good thing. L argues that perfections are in things themselves, they indicate excellence of objects themselves.

Voluntarism – goodness of things is result of divine will, it ends up making God a tyrant, arbitrariness, takes away our own judgment of goodness of things, evil and good is arbitrary. All act of will presuppose reason for willing and this reason is naturally prior to will.

Descartes' position on Eternal Truth – principle of non-contradiction or math truths. D thinks that these truths are true by the will of god. God is efficient cause, all truths are effects of divine will. This is example of voluntarism regarding eternal truths. No1 else agrees with this position. If everything depends on god's free choice to such degree, then we have to admit possibility that God could have created world where something could be black and not-black and 2+2=5. this position renders our reason useless, we couldn't know the world by pure reason. Rationalist couldn’t agree with it.

Naturalism - Spinoza argues that all truth follows from divine nature, which is logically prior to anything else in the divine. Intellect gives the will something to will about. S is a naturalist regarding eternal truth. Nature, intellect and divine will in that order. So eternal truths are result of divine nature and so prior to divine intellect and will, every truth follows from divine nature. S is naturalist. Malebranche has a different position: objective reason that makes us all rational is God's own self image. M is also a sort of naturalist about eternal truth, he said that God has to act as reason tells him to act because he by nature loves order which is part of reason, so god’s reason is more powerful than god. He always acts accordingly to his reason. For S all contingent truths are also necessary also, but hard to understand.

Leibniz is an intellectualist about eternal truths. Not only god’s will is productive, what makes things true, divine intellect is also a productive power, but acts in a diff way producing diff sort of thing. Will produces contingent truths that could be otherwise, not necessarily true. Intellect produces necessary eternal truths, the opposite of them involves a contradiction. God does not produce truths out of free choice it is result of god's understanding of himself, these truth are result of God being rational. L has active view of intellect.

Why are those truths true? Is because nature of universe is that way, or maybe in some other universe some other truth are foundational.

Descartes makes necessary truths high level contingent truths. Spinoza collapse contingent truths into necessary truths, but just don't have the same knowledge as of necessary truths. L ultimate theory of relation b/w contingent and necessary truths is that last can be reached by finite analysis while contingent require infinite analysis and only god can do it. Malebranche position is that there are necessary and there are contingent truths and they are completely different sorts of things.

God acts necessarily in perfect ways

Is this the best possible world?

L says yes! And its obvious. God (perfect) so he acts in best possible way so does he make the world perfect? Aquinas says, yeah… but in a very limited sense. (teacher writes bad essay as example of errors to teach his students) Traditional view, yes god is perfect and always acts in best possible way and yes world is best possible but we don’t have a clear idea of what god is doing so it allows world itself be extremely imperfect. Another view (L has it in mind), Malebranche is his target. (Arnauld greatest critic of Malebranche).

God is able to make world more perfect than this one, where rain falls where needed. But to do it he will have to multiply laws of physics, no longer simple. In short, this world is very imperfect, M says, what matters is that god has to act in best possible way, simple and orderly way, b/c this world can be understood in simple laws of physics. L insists that this world is best possible world! Some aspects if considered on their own are not perfect, but taken as a whole, is the best. Simplest and richest way. This world unifies in the simplest way the richest diversity of effects. Two goals of god, to act in simplest way and to produce richest effect, this world is at intersection of those two goals. Proportion b/w god's action and what he does in acting. World with lot of minds and each mind can see it from different perspective, thus its kinda creating many worlds.

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